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Introduction 
O ne of the more notorious quotations widely attributed to George W. Bush, when he was campaigning fo r the presidency of the United States in 2000, 
was something lathe effect that "[wJedon't do nation-building." As with many at-
tributed quotations. the actual remark he made was less curt and slightly more 
nuanced. What actually happened was that in the course of a presidential debate 
with his opponent, Vice President AI Gore, Bush was asked ifhe would have sup-
ported US military involvement in the ill-fated expanded United Nations Opera-
tion in Somalia (UNOSOM II ) in 1993-941 had he been president at the time. This 
is what he actually said in reply: 
[Somalia] [sJtarted off as a humanitarian mission and it changed into a nation-
building mission, and that's where the mission went wrong. The mission was changed. 
And as a result, our nation paid a price. And so I don't think our troops ought to be 
used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and 
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win war. I think our troops ought to be used to help overthrow the dictator when it's in 
our best interests. But in this case [i.e., SomaliaJ it was a nation-building exercise. and 
same with Haiti . [2J I wouldn't have supported either.! 
This antipathy notwithstanding, and despite former President Bush's best ef-
forts amid the rhetoric of the "Global War on Terror," the realities of the transna-
tional military operational environment in the first decade of the twenty- first 
century have produced an exponential growth in the importance of what are now 
generally termed stability (or stabilization) operations, to such an extent that even 
US military doctrine now acknowledges such operations as "a core U.s. military 
mission . .. [to I be given priority comparable to combat operations. "4 The Ministry 
of Defence in the United Kingdom, whose long experience with so-called "small 
wars" in the postcolonial context during the withdrawal from Empire (approxi-
mately during the period 1945-65, including conflicts in Palestine, Malaya, Cy-
prus, Kenya and Aden) has led some foreign observers to suggest a particular 
mastery of nation-building and counterinsurgency campaigns,5 has on1y recently-
in Jan uary 2009--circulated a working draft of what will eventually become the 
first promulgation of a British doctrine on such operations.6 
The current campaign in Afghanistan has been described as "a test case for in-
ternational deve10pment assistance and bi- and multilateral cooperation'" even in 
the midst of sustained combat operations in substantial parts of the country, 
whereby "the main problems .. . are restoring security and establishing a function-
ing state."8 Stability operations seem to have become the catchphrase for a new 
generation of military actions: indeed, they have come to be viewed as an essential 
stage in the type of conflicts most prevalent today, namely, asymmetric conflicts 
between State and non-State actors. In order to win the war it has become essential, 
in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, to win the peace, and that is done by stabilizing 
the situation in theater after the initial opposition has been defeated or at least con-
tained.9 The moment of hubris, when President Bush landed on the aircraft carrier 
USS Abra},am Lincoln on May I, 2003 and declared that major combat operations 
in Iraq had ended, did not in fact herald the conclusion of hostilities in Iraq: the co-
alition merely swapped one enemy (the State armed forces of the defeated Saddam 
Hussein regime) for another (various assorted non-State militias representing dif-
ferent sectors of Iraqi society, along with groups affiliated with AI Qaeda). In Af-
ghanistan, by way of contrast, the main enemy has stayed the same-Le., the 
Taliban- but its status changed from being the de facto government in control of 
up to 90 percent of Afghan territory in September 200 I, to that of an insurgency 
dispersed in (mainly) the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. Al-
though intensive military operations against the Taliban continue, international 
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coalition forces in Afghanistan, acting in concert with the Afghan government of 
President Hamid Karzai, are attempting at the same time to contin ue apace with 
the reconstruction and development of the country: in a word, nation-building. 10 
Military operations in circumstances such as those prevailing in Afghanistan are 
situated at the intersections of two major fault lines in public international law: 
namely, they are at the junction of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, and simulta-
neously (within the jus in bello) at the junction of international and non-international 
armed conflicts. This article will, first, define stability operations in doctrinal terms 
and situate them within an international legal context. The significance of their legit-
imacy under the jus ad bellum will be briefly considered and related to the context of 
Afghanistan before their classification in terms of the international law of armed 
conflict (LOAC) will be analyzed. The application of the jus in bello to such opera-
tions will then be discussed, with reference to some specific operational problems 
such as the status and treatment of insurgents captured by coalition forces in Af-
ghanistan, and the targeting of such insurgents. Finally, some tentative conclusions 
will be suggested as to the international law applicable to stability operations. 
From Peacekeeping to Stability Operations 
The phrase "stabili ty operations" may represent, to some extent, new terminology; 
but it does emphatically not refer to a new phenomenon in the continuum of mili-
tary operations. The military doctrinal term previously applied in the United States 
and United Kingdom was "military operations other than war" (MOOTW), a term 
that somehow always seemed to carty a faint hint of derision but nevertheless was 
undeniably useful as a catch-all phrase: in effect, it covered practically the entire 
spectrwn of military operations, excluding only all-out "war."ll From the mid-
1950s until the early 1990s the principal manifestation ofMOOTW was in "classic" 
peacekeeping operations undertaken pursuant to UN mandates. 
Starting in 1992 with the situation in Somalia, the United Nations began to use 
two new terms-"peace enforcement" and "peace building"-which were distin-
guished from traditional peacekeeping. While peacekeeping involved the interpo-
sition of a military force with host State consent in order to supervise ceasefire or 
peace agreements already in place, typically with very restrictive rules of engage-
ment that extended no further than authorizing the use of force in self-defense, 
peace enforcement came to be used to refer to what might be described as a 
"beefed-up peacekeeping operation," namely one in which the situation re-
mained unstable enough to allow for an expansion of the permitted use of force 
in order to maintain the peace. This wouJd generally occur in situations where the 
parties to the confli ct might have reached a ceasefire or interim peace accord, but 
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its observance was too fragile for the interpositional force to preserve a passive 
role. Peace enforcement, in other words, was proactive and essentially involved 
the international force taking sides in the enforcement of obligations already en-
tered into by the belligerents. 12 Peace building, on the other hand, encompassed a 
much wider range of activities designed to prevent the resumption or prolifera-
tion of a particular conflict, from disarmament and demobilization of the warring 
parties to election monitoring, from the strengthening of State institutions to the 
promotion of human rights and from the repatriation of refugees to the provision 
of humanitarian aid.D UN-mandated missions throughout the 1990s in Somalia, 
Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo all had various combinations of the 
above list of activities taking place simultaneously. Their salient feat ure for the 
purposes of this discussion was that they all took place in conditions of continu-
ing armed conflict or, at the very least, serious civil unrest. 
Strangely, however, although the range of activities being assigned to these mis-
sions grew and although there was often manifestly no peace to keep, few outside 
the United Nations adopted the new terminologies outlined above: within the US 
government, fo r example, Congress continued to use the generic term "peacekeep-
ing" to refer to all such operations, while the executive branch adopted the simi-
larly generic "peace operations." In both cases, the inclusion of the word "peace" 
was manifestly misplaced since it created the misleading impression that such op-
erations involved comparatively little risk for the military personnel assigned to 
them, whereas in fact they often saw soldiers in what amounted to full-scale 
warfighting operations. This, coupled with the stigma of failure that came in many 
circles to be attached to "'peace operations" in 1990s, contr ibuted-at least on a 
psychological level-to the shift in language away from peace and toward stability. 
Peace became the endgame, the ultimate objective to be achieved; hence, jus ad 
pacem. But the realities on the ground in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, with all 
their complexities and ambiguities, forced a general recognition that in order to 
have peace, it is necessary to have stability. 
The US Department of Defense currently characterizes stability operations as 
"[ m ]ilitary and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to 
conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions."14 The US doctrinal 
defmition of stability operations ("missions, tasks and activities [that] seek to main-
tain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government 
services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitar ian relief' IS) is situ-
ated within the following contemporary context: 
The character of this conflict [i.e., the post-2!XH security environment] is unlike any 
other in recent American history, where military forces operating among the people of 
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[thel world will decide the major battles and engagements. The greatest threats to our 
national security will not come from emerging ambitious states but from nations 
unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs and aspirations of their people. Here, the 
margin of victory will be measured in far different terms from the wars of our past. 
However, time may be the ultimate arbiter of success: time to bring safety and security 
to an embattled populace; time to provide for the essential, immediate humanitarian 
needs of the people; time to restore basic public order and a semblance of normalcy to 
life; and time to rebuild the institutions of government and market economy that 
provide the foundations for enduring peace and stability. This is the essence of stability 
operations. 16 
It is very telling-and very relevant for the assumption of this author, that the 
conduct of stability operations must be subject to the international law of armed 
conflict-that this description of the context for stability operations explicitly 
places them within a continuum of military operations, that is to say, in a spectrum 
of activity that in itself is closer to war than to peace. 
In the United Kingdom, despite the lack at present of a formally promulgated 
doctrine on stability operations, military thinking is very much on the same lines as 
that of our US counterparts. Stability operations are understood to be those that 
impose security and control in a defined area while restoring and developing infra-
structure and selVices, in collaboration with appropriate civilian agencies. They 
may involve kinetic or non-kinetic applications of force and may occur before, 
during or after major combat operations; or indeed, they may in themselves be the 
primary objective of a campaign. Their desired endgame, ultimately, is always to 
secure a transition of power and control to the civilian authorities of the host State. 
Recently the Chief of the UK General Staff characterized stabili ty operations as 
involving "several different lines of operation---ensuring security, rebuilding es-
sential selVices, promoting good governance and facilitating economic regenera-
tion."l7 Discussing future trends for the British armed forces, he said: 
Instead of adapting each time we deploy, it is dear from recent experiences that we 
should be structured and trained to conduct an Intervention and Stabilisation 
operation almost as the default setting, with the right forces and the correctly qualified 
personnel with the right training to deliver the right effect from the outset. 
And this will require both kinetic and non-kinetic means--there will always be a need 
for soldiers who are trained to fight a hostile and implacable enemy, but there will also 
be a need for soldiers who are trained to deliver essential services until the situation is 
safe enough for civil agencies to engage; so there will be a need for soldiers trained to 
deliver humanitarian assistance, to assist with the delivery of local governance!,) and 
for soldiers who are experts in the local politics and culture of the area, and who can 
therefore initiate the early stages of reconciliation and peace-building. l8 
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Perhaps the most significant aspect of General Dannatt's remarks is his sugges-
tion that stability operations be regarded "almost as the default setting" for future 
British military capabilities. This reflects the British view that "major combat oper-
ations" -full-scale inter-State armed conflicts which have as their objective the to-
tal defeat of a governmental enemy, leading to its removaJ from power-are very 
much the exception in the contemporary paradigm of "fourth-generation war-
fare." In both the Afghanistan (2001 ) and Iraq (2003) campaigns, operations di-
rected against the State (the TaJiban in the former case, Saddam's armed forces in 
the latter) were over remarkably quickly; yet counterinsurgency fighting continues 
to this day, alongside attempts to transform the institutions and infrastructure of 
these failing States into stable, functioning authorities that are able to maintain law 
and order. Whether or not one accepts in abstracto the Bush administration's char-
acterization of the contemporary security environment for America and her allies 
as a "long war, "19 ongoing stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have aspects 
that definitely amount in effect to "war," even while the stated objective is peace. 
Stability operations are nowhere mentioned in international law; neither the jus 
ad bellum nor the jus in bello explicitly recognizes the concept. Nevertheless, in 
light of the foregoing, it must be stated categorically that a key feature of contem-
porary stability operations is international legitimacy (as will be seen in the next 
section with specific reference to Afghanistan). While legitimacy is not the same 
thing as legality, the prevalent view in both the United States and the United King-
dom is that the main framework for international legitimacy is international legal-
ity: stability operations must take place on the basis of sound authority in 
internationaJlaw, and must be conducted (in their specifically military aspects) in 
accordance with the international law of armed conflict. 
Stability Operations and the Legality of the Use of Force 
Two salient features of contemporary stability operations are that they tend to be 
(1) multilateral, i.e., conducted by coalitions, whether ad hoc or (preferably) 
within the framework of an established military alliance, like the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO); and (2) legitimate, i.e., constituting a lawful use of 
force under either the UN Charter or customary international law-normally the 
former, since no stability operations as presently understood have taken place on 
such a controversial legal basis as the doctrine ofhwnanitarian intervention, for 
instance. Current operations in Afghanistan will hereinafter be taken as the case 
study for discussion of stability operations and international law. 
Although US and coalition forces first commenced military action against the 
Taliban militia and AI Qaeda elements in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring 
392 
David Turns 
Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001 pursuant to the right of individual and collec-
tive self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter (for which no Secu-
rity Council mandate is legally required), and OEF continues to this day primarily 
in southern and eastern Afghanistan, internationally-mandated forces were first 
deployed to the country only in December 2001, after the Taliban had been ejected 
from its seats of power. The last main Taliban urban stronghold, Kandahar, was 
captured by coalition forces on Decem ber 7, two days after the signing of the Bonn 
Agreement, in which delegations of various Afghan political factions committed 
themselves to cooperation in the establishment of an Interim Authority that would 
rebuild the Afghan State after decades of conflict.20 The Bonn Agreement specifi-
cally requested the Security Council 
to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations 
mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its 
surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to 
other urban centres and other areas .... It would also be desirable if such a force were to 
assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's infrastructure.2L 
On December 19 two letters arrived at UN headquarters: one from the Afghan 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the other from his British counterpart. The for-
mer stated somewhat opaquely that the envisaged international security force 
"could be deployed under Chapter VI or VII of the Charter."22 The latter expressed 
the UK's willingness to serve as the initial lead nation for the proposed deploy-
ment, known as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with the core 
missions of ( I ) assisting the establishment of the Interim Administration of Af-
ghanistan in liaison with the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in 
Kabul; (2) providing advice and support to the Afghan administration and the 
United Nations in Kabul on securi ty issues; and (3) preparing for the establishment 
and training of new Afghan national armed and security forces, key infrastructure 
development "and possible future expanded security assis tance in other parts of 
Afghanistan. "23 1be British letter did not refer to specific chapters or articles of the 
UN Charter as the legal basis for the proposed deployment, but stated that it would 
be "based on the willingness expressed [on the part of the Afghan administration 1 
to receive such a fo rce and an authorizing Security Council resolution. "24 The letter 
also emphasized that the proposed international force "will have a particular mis-
sion authorized by a Security Council resolution that is d istinct from O peration 
Enduring Freedom."25 One day later, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VI I 
of the Charter, passed the resolution referred to in the British letter and authorized 
the establishment, for an initial six months, of ISAF.26 Apart from assisting in the 
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maintenance of security in Kabul and surrounding areasP the only other task ex-
pressly mandated to ISAF at this stage was " to provide assistance to help the Afghan 
Interim Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan securi ty and 
armed forces. "28 As far as the use of force by the mission was concerned, the Reso-
lution authorized ISAF troop-contributing nations (TCNs) to take "all necessary 
measures to fulfil its mandate."29 
At this stage, therefore, ISAF was clearly an ad hoc "coalition of the willing" 
formed by mandate of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, with 
the use of force authorized in terms whose broad ambit recalls Article 42 of the 
Charter ("such action ... as may be necessary"). The emphasis by the British-and 
other TCNs--on Afghan consent to the operation, however, would seem to mili-
tate against ISAF being an Article 42 enforcement action, since such actions are 
mandatory in nature and do not require host State consent. I t would plainly be ab-
surd to classify the ISAF mission as classic peacekeeping, because of the extent of 
actual fi ghting that was taking place in Afghanistan at the time of the force's initial 
deployment and that continues to this day. Perhaps better-albeitstill imperfect-
analogies might be the UN's enforcement actions in respect to Korea (1950), the 
Congo (1960) and Haiti (2004). The first case, that of Korea, was in fact the first in-
stance in which the phrase "coalition of the willing" came to be used in the context 
of UN enforcement actions. Following the invasion of the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) by the forces of the Democratic People's Republic and the ROK's appeal to 
the UN for help, Resolution 83 of the Security Council recommended "that the 
Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as 
may be necessary to repel the [North Korean ] armed attack and to restore interna-
tional peace and security in the area.">O The result was three years of intensive hos-
tilities, but the UN-ROK forces were not organized into a UN mission as such, nor 
was their contribution mandatory: it should be remembered that Resolution 83 
merely recommended that UN member States provide military assistance to the 
ROK. Moreover, there was no civilian component and the operation was a classic 
warfighting campaign, with none of the reconstruction and development activities 
associated with stability operations. 
In the second case the United Nations, having received a request fo r military as-
sistance from the Prime Minister of the newly-independent Congo in the face of 
Belgian military intervention and the attempted secession of the province of 
Katanga, authorized the Secretary-General " to take the necessary steps ... to pro-
vide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until ... the 
[Congolese] national securi ty forces may be able, in the opinion of the [Congolese] 
Government, to meet fully their tasks.")] A subsequent resolution on the same 
matter urged "that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures 
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to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for 
cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the 
use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. "32 Although the resulting force, the Or-
ganisation des Nations Unies au Congo, was officially a peacekeeping mission, it did 
become involved in actively suppressing the Katangese secessionists, thereby tak-
ing sides in a way that peacekeeping missions do not normally do. A remarkably 
complex operation for the time, with large civilian and technical components 
alongside military troops, it eventually came to number some twenty thousand of-
ficers and men. 
The third case is perhaps the closest analogy to the deployment of ISAF: the Se-
curity Council created the Mission des Nations Unies pour fa stabilisation en Hai"ti 
(MINUSTAH) in 2004,33 a decade after authorizing a multinational force to inter-
vene and effect " regime change." MINUST AH is Brazilian -led and comprises some 
nine thousand personnel, with both military and civilian components; its wide-
ranging tasks include ensuring a secure and stable environment (including reform-
ing the Haitian National Police and protecting civilians from imminent threat of 
physical violence), supporting the constitutional and political process ( including 
the administration of elections and the extension of State authority and good gov-
ernance at all levels throughout Haiti), the promot ion and protection of human 
rights}! and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance.35 Within that framework, 
in 2004-05 MlNUST AH personnel executed large-scale military raids, using lethal 
force, on the slum of Cite Soleil in the capital city of Port-au-Prince (an anarchic 
area in which armed gangs roam the streets shooting, looting, raping and kidnap-
ping), with subsequent allegations of excessive collateral damage;36 MINUSTAH 
soldiers have been killed, also. 
In Afghanistan, strategic command, control and coordination of ISAF was as-
sumed unilaterally by NATO on August 11,2003,37 and it remains a NATO opera-
tion to the present time-still separate from the American-led OEF, which has a far 
smaller number ofTCNs and is not being executed within the framework of an in-
ternational organization. The Afghan government immediately approved of 
NATO's assumption of the ISAF mandate and, indeed, addressed a formal request 
to the Security Council to expand the mandate so as to permit deployments of lSAF 
outside the Kabul area;38 thus host State consent has continued to be a crucial ele-
ment of the legal basis for stability operations in Afghanistan. This was then ac-
knowledged and formalized by the Security Council in Resolution 1510, which 
authorized the expansion oflSAF's mandate and the continued use of all necessary 
measures to fulfill that mandate.39 The ISAF mandate is renewable at yearly inter-
vals, the latest Security Council authorization at the time of writing dating from 
September 22, 2008 .40 Current troop levels are approximately 55, 100, supplied by a 
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total of forty-o ne States under NATO leadership,4! Particularly prominent among 
ISAF's activities for some years have been the Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs), which operate at a local level to rebuild infrastructure.42 With the increas-
ing emphasis on the need to transfer more and more capability and power in the 
field of security to the Afghan National Army (ANA), a major aspect oflSAF's op-
erations now is the Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams, which are deployed to 
ANA partner-units across the country, with the objective of training and 
mentoring the ANA in its capability for independent operational deployments, co-
ordinating ISAF-ANA liaison and ensuring the provision of enabling support to 
ANA units.H 
The basis ofISAF's stability operations in international law appears uncertain to 
the extent that such operations are nowhere mentioned in the UN Charter, nor do 
they exist as a clear concept recognized by customary international law. Rather, 
they are a military doctrinal construct that reflects the realities of the types of oper-
ations being carried out in environments like that of Afghanistan, where conflicts 
are ongoing but international efforts are being made to shore up the legitimate 
government and increase its capabilities. ISAF is characterized by NATO as deriv-
ing from a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter, despite 
the fact that it is a "coalition of the willing" rather than a UN force.44 In that sense, 
it is quite different from the operations mandated in Congo and Haiti discussed 
earlier. Comparisons with the UN-ROK forces fighting in Korea, the original "co-
alition of the willing," would be more helpful were it not for the fact that the latter 
had no element of stabilization, but were simply charged with fighting a full -scale 
war against external aggression by other States: the intra-State, asymmetric and 
counterinsurgency aspects so prominent in Afghanistan were entirely absent in 
Korea. Official British pronouncements on the legal authority for ISAF are sparse, 
but emphasize the combination of an invitation from the democratically elected 
government of Afghanistan and the mandate provided by the UN Security Council 
in Resolution 1510.45 
We may surmise from the above that stability operations are an emerging con-
cept in the international law governing the use offorce and are thus effectively sui 
get/eris: they have not been previously recognized in customary law and have no ex-
plicit basis in the UN Charter or other treaties--except for ad hoc specific cases like 
(in relation to Afghanistan ) the Bonn Agreement. However, appreciation of their 
legitimacy, through a combination of post-conflict morality and executive legal 
authority, is regarded as essential by States that participate in such operations.46 
They in fact represent a peculiar combination of what might be termed "invited in-
tervention" and "authorized intervention"-itlvited by the host State and autho-
rized by an international organization. Therefore, we may suggest that the jus ad 
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bellum legal basis of stability operations will differ from case to case, but will nor-
mally have in common the following features: ( I ) an invitation by the internation-
ally legitimate government of the host State; (2) a mandate (even if postdating the 
actual start of the operation) from an international organization, ideally the 
United Nations; and (3) a multilateral coalition, either within the framework of an 
existing military alliance such as NATO, or on an ad hoc basis. 
Whether stability operations could eventually take place absent one or more of 
the above features must be a matter of some legal uncertainty. In Operation Palliser 
in May 2000, the United Kingdom unilaterally planned and executed a limited mil-
itary intervention in Sierra Leone, initially for the purpose of evacuating British, 
Commonwealth and European Union citizens at risk from the escalating threat to 
the capital, Freetown, from the advancing insurgent forces of the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF). The noncombatant evacuation operation having been suc-
cessfully accomplished, the British government then expanded the operation-
again, unilaterally-and the troops retained control of the international airport, 
enabled the safe delivery of UN humanitarian aid into Sierra Leone, and provided 
security and stability in Freetown by patrolling the capital. 47 Operation Palliser was 
terminated on June 15,2000, although the United Kingdom continued extensive 
in volvement in ongoing multinational UN efforts to bring peace and secu rity to 
Sierra Leone. 
The government of Sierra Leone did not comment publicly on the Bri tish ac-
tion; neither did the subsequent debates in the British House of Commons48 and 
the House of Lords,49 nor in the UN Security Council,so make any overt reference 
to the legality of the British intervention. Aside from the United Kingdom, eight 
States expressed approval of the Brit ish action in the Security Council,5l as did 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, although he made an oblique reference to the "lim-
ited mandate" of the British troops.52 Following its last meeting to discuss the esca-
lating crisis in Sierra Leone prior to the British deployment, the Security Council 
had issued a presidential statement in which it "call[ed] upon all States in a posi-
tion to do so to assist" the UN forces already present in Sierra Leone, which might 
arguably have been a code that could reasonably have been interpreted as permit-
ting State intervention without the need for any furthe r authority from the UN P 
although neither the Secretary-General nor any of the States in the Council ex-
pressed any views to that effect. None of the Council members that failed explicitly 
to endorse the British intervention actually commented on it at all publicly, so their 
real views on the matter must remain a subject of debate; but they d early acqui-
esced in it. It should be noted that Operation Palliser was not a stability operation 
ab initio, although it did acquire characteristics thereof in the course of its execu-
tion. It was not requested by the host State, nor did it have a mandate from the 
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United Nations, although it was made in support of the UN peacekeeping mission 
already present in Sierra Leone (many of whose personnel were at the time being 
held hostage by the RUF). The e1ement of morality-or perceived legitimacy-was 
undoubtedly present, and the operation was lawful on the basis that it was a limited 
humanitarian intervention for the protection of UK nationals and others for 
whom the United Kingdom had consular responsibilities; but its legality qua stabil-
ity operation cannot be conclusively afftrmed. 
Stability Operations and the International Law of Armed Conflict 
Just as stability operations are not mentioned in the international law governing 
the use of force, so, as a military doctrinal concept rather than a legal construct as 
such, they are equally absent from the international LOAC. To the extent that sta-
bility operations do not involve any actual armed hostilities, in their peaceful and 
civilian aspects, they evidently are not governed by the LOAC at all. The LOAC ap-
plies only in armed conflicts, which are generically defined in customary interna-
tionallaw as existing 
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of 
such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general 
conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement 
is achieved. Until that moment, international hwnanitarian law continues to apply in 
the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole 
territory under the control of a party [to the conflict], whether or not actual combat 
takes place there.54 
It would seem very clear, from the above descriptors, that an armed conflict 
continues to take place in certain parts of Afghanistan (primarily the south and east 
of the country) between the ANA and lSAF on the one hand, and insurgents 
(mostlyTaliban ) on the other. The law which governs the behavior ofISAF troops 
in other parts of the country, which have seen relatively sustained peace for some 
time now, will be considered further below. But to the extent that an armed conflict 
is taking place in certain parts of Afghanistan, it is governed by the LOAC and it is 
necessary to consider what type of conflict that might constitute, as the applicable 
rules differ to some extent between international and non-international armed 
conflicts. 
International armed conflicts are defined in Common Article 2 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions as 
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all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not re1:ognized by one 
of them ... [and) all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. 
There is patently no armed conflict between two or more States in Afghanistan, 
since ISAF forces are present in the territory at the invitation of the State itself and 
are assisting the State against the insurgents. Nor could it conceivably be said that 
there is a "partial or total occupation of the terri tory" by ISAF, since that would 
require that the territory be under the effective control of the occupier, either fol-
lowing the complete defeat of the lawful sovereign (debellatio ) or because the in-
vading force has temporarily asserted its author ity over the territory (belligerent 
occupation). In Afghanistan, ISAF has not occupied the territory belligerently vis-
a-vis the current Afghan government, with which it is allied; and in those areas 
where it operates, it does so emphatically in support of the Afghan government and 
not on its own account. 
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions in 1977 extended the scope of 
application in respect to international armed conflicts to "armed conflicts in which 
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against 
racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination."'s Article 96(3) 
then provides for an "authority representing a people engaged against a high con-
tracting party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in [Article I (4)] " to make 
a unilateral declaration undertaking to apply the Geneva Conventions and Addi-
tional Protocol I. The Taliban has not sought to take advantage of these provisions, 
and even if it did, the argwnent could be defeated easily enough on the basis that 
the rights and obligations of the 1949 Conventions and the 1977 Additional Proto-
col only take effect following a unilateral declaration under Article 96(3) on a basis 
of reciprocity, i.e., the high contracting party in question must also have assumed 
the same rights and obligations under the same instruments. In the case of Afghan-
istan, the State is not a party to Additional Protocol I, and it is hard to see how these 
provisions could be binding upon ISAF States, even to the extent that (like the 
United Kingdom) they are parties to the Protocol. 
If a conflict is not international in nature, then it must-if only by default-be 
non-international in nature. Non-international armed con flicts are defined in Com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as "armed conflict [s] not of an interna-
tional character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties," 
which is essentially a negative definition. The notoriously high threshold of appli-
cation fo r 1977 Additional Protocol II further requires that the conflict be 
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in the territory or a High Contracting Party between its armed rorces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, 
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted mili tary operations and to implement this ProtocoL 56 
Quite apart from the fact that Afghanistan is not a high contracting party to Addi-
tional Protocol II , it is doubtful, in any case, whether the conditions for the applica-
bility of the Protocol would be met by the present stability operations in 
Afghanistan. Article 1 (1) refers only to the armed forces of the high contracting 
party ot! its OWtl territory, which would not cover ISAF; and while the Taliban un-
doubtedly does have control of some territory and carries out "sustained and con-
certed military operations," it is most unlikely that it couJd be considered to be 
"under responsible command" and it has given no sign of willingness to imple-
ment the Protocol. 
The defauJt position under the treaties that constitute the bulk of the LOAC-
particularly the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols-would 
therefore seem to be that stabili ty operations in Afghanistan that involve "resort to 
armed force ... or protracted armed violence" in terms of the Tadic formuJation57 
are neither an international nor a non-international armed conflict, properly 
speaking. Instead, they amount to "armed conflict not of an international charac-
ter" in terms of Common Article 3.58 The trouble with that approach, logical 
though it may be on the text of the treaties, is that Common Article 3, being the 
"minim um yardstick" for humanitarian protection in all armed conflicts, as recog-
nized by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case,59 is notoriously 
vague, imprecise and of the utmost generality. It is for this reason that the recent 
approach of the Supreme Court of Israel, to the effect that Israeli military opera-
tions against Palestinian militants are subject to the law of international armed 
conflicts/>41 is in the opinion of the present author much to be preferred. 
The main basis for this finding, that the military capabilities of Palestinian mili-
tant organizations are such as to equate their threat with that which might emanate 
from a State's armed forces, is at least as true in respect to the Taliban as it is in re-
spect to Hamas. The Israeli court also concluded that the conflict between Israel 
and the Palestinians should be treated as international in nature for the purposes of 
the LOAC on the basis of the transnational nature of the military operations in 
question: they were crossing the internationally recognized frontiers of the State of 
Israel and were related to the context oflsrael's belligerent occupation of the Pales-
tinian territories since 1967.61 Although, as noted above, the aspect of belligerent 
occupation is not relevant in the case of ISAF and Afghanistan, the fact of deploy-
ment of NATO troops across international frontiers in the territory of another 
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State could, by analogy, arguably be sufficient to bring ISAF stability operations 
within the dictum of the Israeli court. 
In light of the above theoretical observations, what practical conclusions may be 
drawn as to the LOAC rules or principles to be applied by ISAF during combat op-
erations in Afghanistan? In respect to the conduct of hostilities by ISAF troops, the 
force commander has recently directed that "[a]1I responses [to dear and identified 
danger] must be proportionate and the utmost of care [sic] should be taken to min-
imize any damage."62 No doubt sensitive to recurrent Afghan complaints of exces-
sive collateral damage caused by airstrikes, he added: 
We are engaged in a counterinsurgency in an extremely demanding environment. We 
are fighting an enemy that often cannot be identified before he has struck and then 
once he has, he hides among the civilian population. The battle is often waged among 
civilians and their property. We must clearly apply and demonstrate proportionality, 
requisite restraint, and the utmost discrimination in our application of firepower. No 
one seeks or intends to constrain the inherent right of self defense of every member of 
the ISAF force. However, Commanders must focus upon the principles which attach to 
every use of force-------be that self defense or offensive fires. Good tactical judgment, 
necessity, and proportionality are to drive every action and engagement; minimizing 
civilian casualties is of paramount importance.63 
If there are difficulties in applying specific treaty instruments of the LOAC to mul-
tinational coalition operations, the directive just cited , in its emphasis on the fun-
damental principles of necessity, proportionality and discrimination, suggests that 
at a minimum the customary rules of the LOAC derived from those principles are 
applicable.64 
In respect to the protection of victims and treatment of persons hors de combat, 
it may be suggested in line with the above reasoning that Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions applies as the "minimum yardstick" of humanitarian 
treatment: 
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness. wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without 
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, 
or any other similar criteria. 
Although there have been reports recently of some unhappiness expressed by British 
service personnel at the fact that wounded Taliban fighters are being treated in the 
same operating theaters and in the same field hospital wards as wounded British 
soldiers,6s it should be noted that this is no less than what is required by Common 
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Article 3 and Articles 12- 15 of Geneva Convention 1.66 As regards civilians, Article 
4 of Geneva Convention IV provides that "[ pJersons protected by the Convention 
are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, 
in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Oc-
cupying Power of which they are not nationals.» Since the stipulation in Article 4 is 
disjunctive ("conflict oroccupation"), it would seem clear that Afghan civilians de-
tained by ISAF troops could be covered by its provisions. In respect to captured 
Taliban fighters, the simplest expedient under the scheme established in Geneva 
Convention III would be either to classify them as prisoners of war (POWs) under 
Article 4(A) (2) (which is most unlikely because of their probable failure to satisfy 
the conditions stated therein), or to treat them as if they were POWs pending adju-
dication of their status under the LOAC by a competent tribunal under Article 5.67 
The above discussion has centered on the type of armed conflict, if any, that 
subsists during the present stabili ty operations in Afghanistan, and the rules and 
principles of the law of anned conflict to be applied to the conduct of ISAF there-
under. But it is entirely possible that in any given place and at any given time in Af-
ghanistan, the situation may be stable and secure, and ISAF troops may 
accordingly not be involved in any armed conflict at all for the purposes of applica-
tion of the LOAC. Although detailed analysis of the law applicable to ISAF in such 
situations is essentially beyond the scope of this piece, recent case law from the 
United Kingdom, arising from obligations under the European Convention on H u-
man Rights (ECHR) as incorporated into UK domestic law by the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (HRA), requires that the likely position showd be at least briefly noted. 
The full implications of the House of Lords decision in R (on the application of A/-
Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence,6il already commented upon by the present 
author in a previous edition of this series,69 remain a matter of some uncertainty. 
For all that, it seems fairly clear that British troops deployed outside the United 
Kingdom on combat operations may be subject, in certain circumstances, to the 
provisions of the ECHR and the HRA. However, none of the cases decided so far in 
the British courts concerning the application of human rights law arise from the 
specific situation of Afghanistan and, indeed, all are materially distinguishable 
from the Afghan situation in one way or another. The AI-Skeini case, for example, 
arose in the context of British operations in Iraq at a time when that country was 
generally recognized to be in a state of belligerent occupation; as already indicated 
above, belligerent occupation is not relevant to Afghanistan at all. In the Behrami 
and Saramati cases, the European Court of Human Rights found certain actions 
(and, therefore, potential violations of the ECHR) by the multinational force in 
Kosovo since 1999 to be directly imputable to the United Nations itself, rather than 
to the individual TCNs. But that was in the context of an operation over which the 
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Security Council retained ultimate authority and control, with very specific alloca-
tion of tasks (Le., de-mining) in the relevant Security Council resolution and in a 
territory that had neither sovereignty nor effective government of its own at the 
material time.7° In Afghanistan, by contrast, the relevant resolutions do not allo-
cate detailed specific tasks, authority and control rests with NATO and the North 
Atlantic Council, and Afghanistan remains a sovereign State with a legitimate gov-
ernment. Finally, two recent English cases7l concerning liability for human rights 
violations in circumstances where British troops had actual custody of civilian de-
tainees in Iraq again largely turn on detailed obligations under relevant Security 
Council resolutions (which are not applicable in the case of Afghanistan), their in-
teraction with broader obligations under customary international law and the ef-
fect of Article 103 of the UN Charter.72 
The AI-Skeini case is currently on appeal to the European Court of Hwnan 
Rights so its final legal effect is likely to remain of uncertain scope and ambit for 
some time yet. At present, therefore, the most that can be asserted on the basis of 
current case law is that British forces on stability operations will be required to ap-
ply the ECHR and HRA if they are in belligerent occupation of territory and to per-
sons under their effective control for the purposes of jurisdiction under the human 
rights instruments (which, as the House of Lords decided in AI-Skeini, is a higher 
standard than effective control under the LOAC and will essentially require British 
troops to have actual custody of civilian detainees). For reasons explained be1ow, 
these conditions do not obtain in current stability operations in Afghanistan and 
are most unlikely ever to do so. 
Conclusion: The United Kingdom and Stability Operations 
Every State will take a different view on the detennination of the existence of a state 
of armed conflict and the nature thereof. Generally the approach of the United 
Kingdom is to be as vague as possible concerning the legal classification of military 
operations in which British forces are engaged and to concentrate instead on the le-
gal basis for such operations. Thus, statements from the British Ministry of De-
fence on the deployment and use of British troops in Afghanistan do not refer to 
their participation in an armed conflict in that country, merely to the fact that they 
are present as part ofISAF under the aegis of NATO, with a brief to aid reconstruc-
tion and with the approval of the UN Security Council. 73 The general position in 
the United Kingdom is that the determination of a state of armed conflict is a pol-
icy decision to be made by the government and one that "depends upon the status 
of the parties to the conflict, and the nature of the hostilities. "74 Thus, each individ-
ual situation needs to be examined separately on the basis of its own facts-the 
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actors and the nature of the hostilities-to detennine if it amounts to an armed 
conflict or not. This decision may also be made by the judiciary in the course ofle-
gal proceedings, if relevant. 75 
As far as the British position on the nature of an armed conflict is concerned, 
again as a matter of both law and doctrine, any such determination must be done 
on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts in each given situation.76 The legal 
basis of the decision for UK authorities will be the international law definitions of 
international and non-international armed conflicts referred to above, in conjunc-
tion with the facts on the ground. If British forces are in action against the govern-
ment or other official forces of any other State, the situation will be classified as one 
of international armed conflict-a decision made all the easier by the fact that vir-
tually every State in the world is now a high contracting party to the Geneva Con-
ventions. In any other situation in which British troops are deployed, the situation 
will be regarded as one of de facto non-international armed conflict. Thus, from 
the official point of view of the United Kingdom, the ongoing hostilities in Afghan-
istan and Iraq are in effect treated as internal conflicts in which UK forces are par-
ticipating on the side of the governments of those States. The conflict in 
Afghanistan after the removal of the Taliban from de facto power in December 
2001 is not considered to be a conflict between the British and Afghan States; it is 
between Afghan insurgents and the Afghan State, and the latter (with the sanction 
of the UN Security Council) invited British troops, along with those of other 
NATO States, to assist it in combating the insurgency, maintaining or restoring law 
and order, and assisting with reconstruction and development. 
Although this position might seem counterintuitive-how can forces of one 
State be engaged in hostilities in another State, against foreign nationals, yet the 
conflict not be regarded as an international one?-it is in fact not devoid of sense 
from a strictly legal perspective. If the British and Afghan States are not at war with 
each other, but there is a conflict going on in Afghanistan, it cannot be interna-
tional according to the definitions in the Geneva Conventions or Additional Pro-
tocol I; therefore, by default, it must be "not international. " Whether it is then 
governed by Common Article 3 or by Additional Protocol II will depend, as far as 
British authorities are concerned, on whether the non-State party to the conflict is 
fighting under responsible command, has control of territory and is able to imple-
ment Additional Protocol 11.77 Again, this will be a policy decision made by the 
government.78 
As for the specific rules oflaw applicable to British forces in Afghanistan, if those 
forces are engaged in actual armed hostilities, particular rules of the LOAC will ap-
ply as above. In respect to targeting operations, the United Kingdom as a matter of 
policy applies the rules concerning target selection and precautions in attack that 
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are contained in Additional Protocol I to all military operations, irrespective of the 
classification of the anned conflict in question.79 In respect to detainees, given the 
UN mandate and the general context of stability operations in Afghanistan, British 
policy is to surrender all detainees to the Afghan authorities as quickly as possible 
after processing.80 This latter policy may in due course be exposed to legal chal-
lenge, on the basis of concerns that the detainees' human rights may be violated in 
Afghan custody and in light of the UK's obligation of non-refoulement under the 
ECHR, as discussed particularly in the very recent decision in AI-Saadoon and 
Mufdhi.sl 
Finally, is should be borne in mind that under the military law of the United 
Kingdom,S2 British troops remain subject to the ordinary criminal law of the land 
wherever in the world they may be deployed and irrespective of whether or not 
they are deployed in a situation of anned conflict. Throughout the so-called 
"Troubles" in Northern Ireland (1969-2007), the use offorce by British troops 
providing support to the civil authority was regulated by the ordinary criminal law, 
resulting in periodic trials of individual British soldiers (who had been accused of 
using excessive force) on charges of murder or manslaughter. The same principles 
apply when the deployment is to a territory outside the United Kingdom. In Bid v. 
Ministry of Defence,83 it was accepted in principle that aspects of civil law-notably 
the torts of negligence and trespass to the person--could also be applicable in situ-
ations where British troops deployed on certain types of operation abroad could be 
shown to have a duty of care toward any persons killed or wounded as a result of 
their actions. It was emphasized that this will not be the case in full combat opera-
tions,St but it may very well turn out to be relevant to stability operations. 
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